This is a welcome intervention. It calls attention to an important question in theorizing the contemporary world order, especially the proliferation of global governance arrangements. It is also welcome because it is based on a 'Poulantzian reading;' welcome because Poulantzas remains an underutilized resource in the study of international relations. 2 Furthermore Taylor's critique implicitly raises an issue that deserves much more attention by advocates of TC and TNS, namely the problem of 'upscaling' concepts to the global level. The lack of sufficient explicit attention to the theoretical implications of conceptual upscaling is a weakness in the TC and TNS literature, making the opposition to the concept to some extent self-inflicted. But it is a weakness that can and should be remedied, and one of my purposes here is to contribute to that.
But it is also a problematic intervention for several reasons. Important parts of the critique can be rejected on empirical grounds, on some points it constructs straw men, it fails to address the problem that transnationalism seeks to solve, and it is questionable whether Taylor's 'Poulantzian reading' is based on the only possible reading of Poulantzas and, indeed, whether it is the best one. Overall therefore, Taylor's critique is not convincing.
I will first summarize Taylor's critique. Then, as preliminary to addressing his arguments, I will discuss what a 'Poulantzian reading' can and should mean and offer some comments on how to analyse and work with theoretical concepts, given that two concepts, class and state, are central to the discussion. Then I engage with Taylor's critique of first the transnational class concept and then the transnational state, leading on to my conclusion.
TAYLOR'S CRITIQUE
Concerning a transnational capitalist class Taylor does not reject that transnationalization has happened, is ongoing and is important, also for capitalist classes. He states that 'it is true that ruling classes have been progressively integrated into transnationalizing class structures' 3 and that 'transnationalization of class relations has considerably intensified with the onset of globalization'. 4 Taylor writes about 'the transnationalizing internal bourgeoisie' in the singular, for instance: 'The erstwhile hegemony of an essentially nation-based capitalist class has been elevated to the global scale by this transnationalizing class, the fraction with the greatest influence on international institutions.' 5 But based on the context this must be read as a general statement about classes in several countries so that according to Taylor there is a plurality of such transnationalizing classes that together has a significant global political impact, and not one international or global or transnational capitalist class.
Indeed, Taylor also makes this point explicitly; he rejects the notion of a transnational capitalist class.
To substantiate this he forwards three arguments. The first is to introduce the criterion of being 'a unified bloc' as a precondition for speaking about a capitalist class: 'the idea that a transnational capitalist class exists (or can exist) as a unified bloc cannot be accepted, as it underestimates the horizontal socioeconomic and political competitiveness and contestations between individual capitals.' 6 The second argument is that while we have 'transnationalizing ruling classes', 'this process is ongoing and incomplete and contra the transnational capitalist class thesis, this has not been incompatible with state sovereignty and territoriality.' 7 The third argument is that 'class contradiction will always remain and the nation-state will be the primary terrain where such contradictions are resolved.' 8 Thus, Taylor in a sense accepts the drift of the transnational class argument, but claims that it has gone too far because there is no unified bloc, the TC thesis underestimates or ignores the domestic level, and more strongly: the domestic level is and will remain the primary terrain.
For this reason, Taylor argues, the better approach is to build on Poulantzas' concept of the internal bourgeoisie, 9 'the transnationalizing internal bourgeoisie' is the driving force behind 'neoliberalism at the national level, thereby effecting a globalizing trend.' 10 The critique of the transnational state concept is stronger but also more central because, according to Taylor, 'a transnational state is at the heart of the global capitalism thesis.' 11 As in relation to the class concept Taylor acknowledges the reality and importance of the transnationalization of political processes: 'it is equally true that many pivotal economic, social, and political processes have become transnationally oriented.' 12 But then several arguments are forwarded about limits of this process, adding up to the conclusion that 'it is too far a conceptual leap to advocate the existence of a transnational state.' 13 The most important argument, stated several times through the paper, is that the TNS thesis ignores the domestic level. Thus transnationalization processes 'are all permitted by the agglomeration of The alternative to the TNS and TC theses is summarized in this way: 'the task is to conceptualize the internal relationship between an enduring state system and an evolving global capitalism with regard to the current transnationalization of production processes. Indeed the debate should be over the role that nation-states play in promoting home-based capitalist interests.' 25 These arguments will be considered critically below, but first the question of a Poulantzian reading.
WHAT IS A POULANTZIAN READING?
There is no questioning that Taylor uses and builds on central Poulantzian concepts: class, state, power bloc, hegemony, and interior bourgeoisie. I have no issue with this; these are indeed some of Poulantzas' major contributions and they are useful and have continued relevance. In so far as Taylor's argument utilizes these concepts he is on Poulantzian ground. 30 French discussions about industrial policy, 31 by studies of the French elite, census data and more. 32 In the same way, the analysis of the democratizations processes in Southern Europe was a theoretical interpretation of unfolding events that he had followed
closely. This book, however, also illustrates one of the weaknesses in Poulantzas' method.
A Neglect of Concrete Analyses
The book was 'addressed to a relatively well-informed readership, who have been following the events in these countries with a political interest, and 
Engaging With Methods Discussions
This distancing from empiricism has consequences for the understanding of the status of theoretical concepts. Thus, for instance, Poulantzas wrote about 'an empiricist conception of knowledge which cannot recognize the proper autonomy of theory.' 37 The context for these comments was a discussion of how Marxist concepts differed from '"schemas", "models", or "ideal types,"' 38 all of which he saw as ultimately relying on an empiricist conception of knowledge. There are two elements in his alternative; one is that a concept is not to be constructed by 'an abstraction from […] real phenomena'; the second is that a concept should be elaborated in relation to other concepts; the concept of the capitalist state should be elaborated in relation to the concept of the capitalist mode of production.
This deserves a more thorough discussion than possible here. For present purposes it suffices to say that the second point remains valid but that the first point can be read as if empirical information is irrelevant for theoretical work ('the autonomy of theory') -contra the evident inductive element in his own work. It can also be read as a result of his first book's carrying a valid point too far: the point that theoretical work is important in its own right and is a relatively separate activity, which is different from being 'autonomous;' later he acknowledged that his 'theoreticism' had led to 'an over-rigid epistemological position.' 
THE STRUCTURE AND NATURE OF CONCEPTS
Turning to my second preliminary issue, I will introduce a few distinctions and categories that are useful for analysing concepts. I draw these from methods discussions in political science, where, over the last decades, at least since Collier and Mahon The second point is the distinction between two types of concepts, 'necessary and sufficient condition concepts' (NSC concepts for short) and 'family resemblance concepts'-a distinction first introduced by the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. 49 The first type specifies a set of conditions or criteria, where each is necessary for a phenomenon to fall under the concept, and where together they are sufficient for this to be the case. In other words: all the criteria must be met, and no other criteria are required. The second type, family resemblance concepts or family concepts, are so labelled because of an analogy to human families. There is some resemblance between all members of a family, but all members differ from each other and there is not a definite set of features that all members share. 50 Two members can even have no features in common but still share enough features with other members of the family to be recognizable as members of the same family.
Drawing on these two preliminaries -my understanding of 'a Poulantzian reading' and of the nature, structure and dimensions of theoretical concepts -I now turn to Taylor's critique of the concepts of transnational class and state.
A TRANSNATIONAL CAPITALIST CLASS?
The Class Concept had neither a political organization nor an ideology of its own, but still was the factor that could explain the rise of Bonapartism. 54 Another and more recent example is the impact on French economic policy of 'non-monopoly capital', showing that this 'class fraction' that 'exists in its own right but without constituting a social force' nevertheless has 'pertinent effects' at the political level. 55 The second variety of a 'specific presence' is where a class has a political ideology and organization of its own, and therefore qualifies as a 'distinct and autonomous class, as a social force'.
A Transnational Capitalist Class?
Turning now to the question of a transnational capitalist class, there seems to be agreement that such as class exists at the economic level. This is the implication of Taylor's argument that 'ruling classes have been progressively integrated into transnationalizing class structures'. Neither does Taylor dispute that these transnationalizing class structures have pertinent political and ideological effects, so the disputed question is whether a transnational capitalist class exist in the strong sense of the word, as a social force. Does it have a political ideology and organization of its own?
When answering this we note that the weaker criterion -pertinent effects -is contained in the stronger one -ideology and organization. Hence we have a two-dimensional strong class concept:
economic presence and ideology + organization. Both are necessary, together they are sufficient;
class is a NSC concept. As there is no or only little disagreement about the first criterion, it is sufficient to consider the second. Whether this criterion is met is an empirical question and there is robust evidence to show that this condition is fulfilled.
The study of 'the global corporate elite and the transnational policy-planning network' by Carroll and In sum: the structure of the class concept is such that it recognizes the existence and importance of divisions within the capitalist class but maintains that these are precisely divisions within a class.
Whether there is a class or not is decided on the basis of the dimensions of the first two levels of the concept; the third level adds new dimensions and complexity to the picture of this class.
In consequence, Taylor's first argument against the TNC concept misses the point. The argument was that 'the idea that a transnational capitalist class exists (or can exist) as a unified bloc cannot be accepted, as it underestimates the horizontal socioeconomic and political competitiveness and contestations between individual capitals'. Claiming that a transnational capitalist class exists in the sense of identity, articulated shared interests and organizations is not the same as claiming that it is a 'unified bloc', nor does it deny the possibility or reality of conflicts and tensions between the nationally constituted parts of this class. Therefore, to some extent, the critical arguments forwarded by Sean Starrs 65 also miss the point. The fact that capital is much stronger organized at the national level does not preclude the possibility that it also is organized transnationally, and it does not preclude the existence of important cleavages and conflicts within the transnational power bloc. Indeed, no capitalist classes are 'unified blocs' and the fact that some fractions or sections of a class are more powerful than others, as shown convincingly by Starrs in the case of US capital, 66 does not preclude the existence of important shared strategic interests between them and the capacity to pursue those interests accordingly.
Taylor's second argument against the TNC concept is twofold: that state sovereignty and territoriality still exist and that 'class contradiction will always remain and the nation-state will be the primary terrain where such contradictions are resolved.' 67 These arguments bring in the state; and for good reasons in a Poulantzian context. Poulantzas was a state-and-class theorist, insisting that classes should be understood in their relations to the state and that conversely, a class perspective is essential in understanding the state. Therefore these arguments are addressed (and largely refuted) in the next section.
A TRANSNATIONAL CAPITALIST STATE?

Levels and Dimensions in the State Concept
Poulantzian state theory is complex with several themes and sub-themes. At the basic level the state is defined by its function as the factor of cohesion for a class-divided social formation or 'the regulating factor of its global equilibrium as a system,' 68 75 The capitalist state is also characterized by the rule of law, it is based on and upholds a legal order that 'forms a set of abstract, general, formal and strictly regulated norms, 76 differentiating it from non-capitalist legal orders. Thus 'the legitimacy of its concentration of organized force is a "rational-legal" legitimacy based on law.' 77 Finally, the capitalist state is a centralized territorial state. The monopoly on violence relates to a territory with fixed borders and to the population in that territory. 78 In short: the dimensions of the concept of the capitalist state are the power relations, state functions, state apparatuses, structured sites of contestation, monopoly on violence in relation to a fixed territory, and a codified rational legal order based on abstract principles.
A Transnational State?
There It is fair to say that proponents of the TNS concept have paid insufficient attention to this, and this is why the critique of and opposition to the concept to some extent is self-inflicted. But before considering the consequences, costs and benefits of this operation, let us look at the empirical evidence for the relevance of a family resemblance concept of the transnational state.
Transnational State Apparatuses
Based on this definition of the state concept, the question is whether there is a transnational state,
or rather in what way it makes sense to talk about the TNS? What are the phenomena that falls under the dimensions of the capitalist state concept?
There are state apparatuses that perform or contribute to the performance of state functions and are transnational in nature. Looking at the economic modality of the state's overall function, this includes the provision of the institutional requisites for the reproduction of capitalist relations of production. 83 In this regard we can point to the IMF, the BIS and the Basel Committee, international organisations (IOs) that working with national ministries and central banks, i.e. being transnational, maintain and develop the payment infrastructure and monetary system that enables the swift transfer of money from one jurisdiction and national currency to another. The regulation of finance is similarly performed through transnational networks centred on these organisations.
To this we can add the large body of international commercial law that is a requisite for international trade and investment, along with the array of globalized business regulations and standards that are required for the routinized cross-border exchange of commodities. This is solidly documented in Braithwaite and Drahos' comprehensive and empirically rich study of global business regulation, 84 and discussed by me in a state theoretical context. 85 Beyond these areas we can also point to essential services such as the World Meteorological Organization' role in facilitating cooperation among national weather services to provide weather forecasts to shipping and aviation, and so on.
Another function is securing the reproduction and qualification of the labour force. 86 This involves education and training, health issues, labour standards, housing, and more. IOs such as UNESCO, UNICEF, the World Health Organization, the World Bank, the International Labour Organization and the OECD, working with national governments, contribute to the performance of various aspects of this state function.
The OECD deserves a special comment for two reasons. The first is that although it mainly has developed capitalist countries as members, its statuary purpose includes promoting global growth and furthermore, over the last several decades non-members have increasingly become directly involved in its work. 87 Hence its relevance in the present context. The second reason is that the OECD epito- non-state actors, whether such access is formalized or not. 90 Furthermore, much of the work in the IOs is done in lower levels committees, working groups and so on, and here non-state actors none the least from business organisations, are often involved.
Finally, the last constitutive characteristic of the capitalist state is the centralised monopoly of violence. As already said, such a monopoly does not exist at the global level, the formal charter of the UN Security Council notwithstanding. Still, it is worth mentioning that there are features pointing in this direction, such as international police cooperation and cooperation in the fight against terror and against piracy in the Bay of Aden. There obviously is very little in this glass, but it is not completely empty.
In conclusion: concerning four of the five basic characteristics of the capitalist state, there is solid empirical evidence to back up the claim that a transnational state exists. This implies that the concept is changed from a NSC concept to one of family resemblance; a theoretical move that carries both costs and benefits as will be discussed later.
Going back to Taylor's arguments, it is telling that he not really addresses the questions of state apparatuses, functions, sites of contestation, and legal order. In other words, he fails to consider and counter the empirically based arguments that are at the core of the transnational state concept.
Instead, the core of his critique is based on two arguments relating to nation states. The first argument is the claim that 'class contradiction will always remain and the nation-state will be the primary terrain where such contradictions are resolved.' 91 The second is that proponents of the TNS downplay or ignore the role of nation states and especially that they ignore the significant differences between them. Let me consider these in turn.
The Nation-State as the Primary Terrain
The claim that the nation-state will remain the primary terrain where contradictions are resolved will come as a surprise to most students of international political economy. The reason is that there is a considerable amount of research that shows a different picture. The following examples should suffice to make this point.
The Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement, signed in 1994, resulted from an international negotiation process where organized business interests played a major role. Indeed, Northern business interests got almost everything they wanted in the agreement and this was the result of the successful mobilization of and lobbying by a coalition of American, European, and Japanese business associations, targeting both their respective governments and the international negotiations. 92 A few years later, a rather different process took place. OECD member states launched negotiations for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) that would considerably strengthen the hand of transnational firms against governments and was intended to eventually be broadened to nonmember states. When the proposed agreement was leaked from the Canadian government, it triggered a large scale transnational mobilization.
'The MAI negotiations were targeted by hundreds of grassroots environmental, consumer, and development organizations and condemned by critics ranging from labour union leaders to movie actresses […] More than 600 organizations in nearly 70 countries expressed disapproval of the talks.' 93 This mobilization was one major reason for why states gave up the project 94 and it signalled a more general change towards transnational patterns of contestation around international economic issues. 95 The regulation of finance is, as mentioned above, an international matter. It is robustly documented that these regulations, both before and after the great financial crisis of 2008, are created in transnational networks that involve international organizations, national state apparatuses, and private sector representatives. 96 Another important contemporary issue is the struggle against tax evasion and harmful tax competition, a battle that includes several IOs, nation states and non-state actors. 97 A large international coalition of NGOs, centred on and to some extent driven by the Tax Justice Network, 98 is active at all levels: nationally, regionally, and globally. Last but not least climate politics must be mentioned. Obviously, in this area decisive action has to be global, based on agreements between all major states, and relies therefore both on national and international political processes. In this case also, non-state actors both from business and civil society are important and active at both levels. The high level of engagement from the private sector at the global level is for instance documented by Corporate Europe Observatory. 101 In all of these examples it would be wrong to claim that the domestic level is irrelevant or insignificant. But it would be equally wrong to claim that the international and global level does not matter.
What is decisive is the combination and integration of the two levels and the fact that in major policy areas action at both levels is necessary and that the international level often is the decisive one. Thus it is misleading and going against a considerable amount of robust research to claim that the nationstate is and will remain the primary terrain. A possible counterargument to this could be, of course, that action at the international level only can happen as a result of decisions made at the national level. But then all major states would have to agree on the policy in question, and this in turn points back to the criticality of the international level. Indeed, it is not very illuminating to insist on identifying one of these levels as the primary one when both are critical. 
Ignoring the domestic Level?
But even if this call for a more nuanced reading of proponents of the TNS concept is accepted, there is some justification for the critique that they have ignored or seriously downplayed the importance of the domestic level and especially ignoring the substantial differences between national political economies. This is the second element in Taylor Furthermore, the scant attention to the domestic level can be seen as stemming from practical limitations. There simply is a limit to how many issues you can deal with seriously within the confines of a research paper or journal article, and even a book, especially if you want a solid empirical basis for your arguments. Thus the relative neglect of the domestic level is the cost of calling attention to important transnational political institutions and processes and making them the focus of analysis. In a more positive light it can also be seen as resulting from a sensible and productive division of labour among scholars.
Still, on this point proponents of the TNS concept must bear some responsibility for the critique by not being sufficiently explicit about the delimitations of their arguments. But on the other hand: it is not justified for critics to assume that focussing on one aspect of current transformations necessarily means that other aspects are deemed irrelevant. This illustrates one of the costs of upscaling the state concept to the global level: you risk being misunderstood and attributed positions you don't take. This leads on to a brief consideration of the costs and benefits of upscaling.
The costs of upscaling
In addition to the just mentioned risk a more important one, from a scientific point of view, is the risk of losing some of the insights and explanatory principles that are inherent in the concept, in the case of the state the insights into the causal links between the dimensions of the concept. Specifically, state theoretical arguments that hinge of the monopoly of violence as a constituent feature cannot be replicated at the transnational level, or only be so in a weakened form. But this does not distract from the relevance of the arguments that can be upscaled.
Another cost is that upscaling increases complexity. This is well illustrated by Phil Cerny's upscaling of neo-pluralism to the global level. Where domestic neo-pluralism studied 'iron triangles,' i.e. stable networks of politicians, bureaucrats and interest groups dominating decision-making in delineated policy-areas, Cerny suggested that transnational neo-pluralism should focus on ' flexible Pentangles' that include states, IOs and non-state actors at both levels. 108 Upscaling the state concept carries similar complexities.
This cost, however, is a consequence of changes in the real world. Policy processes have become more complex because they so often take place in transnational networks that involve a broader range of actors and institutions than previously was the case at the domestic level, and this must be reflected in theory.
Benefits of Upscaling
When considering the benefits it is worth first pointing out that proponents of the TNC and TNS concepts are not alone in finding upscaling of concepts useful. Cerny has already been mentioned, and so has Slaughter who described the 'conceptual shift' that was at the heart of her book in this way:
'stop imagining the international system as a system of states […] Start thinking about a world of governments, with all the different institutions that perform the basic functions of governmentslegislation, adjudication, implementation -interacting both with each other domestically and also with their foreign and supranational counterparts.' 109 And even before these contributions, other scholars did in effect break with 'methodological nationalism' by applying concepts developed for the study of national systems to the international level. 117 Given that Poulantzas introduced the concept of the 'internal bourgeoisie' to capture an important transformation that had taken place in the two decades preceding his analysis, it is odd to argue that there is no need for further theoretical innovation after four decades of globalization. In reality this amounts to ignoring the rise of global governance, the rise of climate politics and other sustainability issues, the rise of global business associations, and so on.
Global governance is a possible alternative concept. It is widely used and it is convenient for descriptive purposes and can serve to identify an object for study and further theorization. But leaving it at that, without drawing in historical materialist theory, would mean ceding this terrain to the various liberal, neo-pluralist, constructivist, realist and other approaches to global governance. In other words, it amounts to abstaining from making historical materialism a participant in and contributor to theoretical debates over important global political realities.
STRAW MEN AND OTHER PECULIARITIES
Before concluding let me briefly comment on the straw men Taylor has constructed to serve his critique. He writes that 'The idea of a transnational state owes its intellectual origins to Karl Kautsky's Ultraimperialismus.' 118 I disagree. The intellectual origin, the source of inspiration, is not Kautsky' text but rather observation of real events and the proliferation of social science research, especially in the field of international political economy, in global and transnational political processes. The reason Taylor fails to appreciate this is perhaps that he himself ignores these developments. To the extent that Kautsky is invoked at all by proponents of the TNS, it is rather to show that arguments in this direction are not entirely alien to historical materialism. The critique of the TNS concept has some validity, largely because proponents of the concept have been insufficiently clear of the consequences for the state concept of upscaling it to the global level.
Specifically it transforms the concept from a 'necessary and sufficient conditions' concept to a family resemblance concept.
When this is acknowledged, the relevance of the TNS concept is that it points to demonstrably existing transnational state apparatuses that perform transnational state functions, shaped by transnational relations of power between social forces, involving both structural power and direct engagement in more or less institutionalised transnational sites of contestation. There are now transnational elements of all fundamental characteristics of the capitalist state except one -the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. The TNS concept is useful and productive for research because it enables the mobilization of insights from state theory and other elements from historical materialism to the analysis of what descriptively is labelled global governance, phenomena whose importance has grown significantly since Poulantzas wrote about 'the interior bourgeoisie' in the 1970s. This
